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Summary 
The health reform legislation recently discussed by Congress 
would develop an infrastructure for the ongoing generation 
and dissemination of information on the comparative 
effectiveness of different health care treatments. The specifics 
of these proposals have not yet been fully defined, even as 
the concept of comparative effectiveness raises concerns for 
many health care stakeholders. 
The quality of health care in the United States is uneven, 
in part because of the lack of reliance on evidence of 
effectiveness in clinical decision-making. Comparative 
effectiveness (CE) seeks to produce better information 
on what health care interventions truly work under what 
circumstances, and to make this information accessible to 
physicians, patients and payers.
What is comparative effectiveness?
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines CE as the study of 
methods to “prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical 
condition or to improve the delivery of care,” including 
alternative approaches to health care delivery, for the purpose 
of assisting “consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy 
makers to make informed decisions that will improve health 
care at both the individual and the population levels.”
Comparative effectiveness research (CER) refers most often 
to primary research on the relative merits or outcomes of one 
intervention, compared to one or more others.
Who is conducting CER?
In the United States, most CER is funded by the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its agencies, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and 
the National Institutes for Health (NIH). Historically, less 
than 0.1 percent of the more than $2 trillion in annual U.S. 
health expenditure was allocated to work on comparative 
effectiveness. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 (ARRA) allocated an additional $1.1 billion in new 
CER to be financed by HHS, NIH and AHRQ. 
Some CER is privately financed, including proprietary, 
primary research funded by those with a financial stake 
in a new health technology, as well as secondary research 
funded by private insurers seeking to inform their benefits 
management programs. Nonprofit organizations and private 
foundations add to the store of knowledge as well.
Efforts to strengthen the research
Studies have found that much of the CER being undertaken in 
the United States is not well coordinated, making it difficult 
to assess the sufficiency and quality of this research. Efforts 
should be made to: 
• Involve patients, clinicians, payers and other decision-
makers in CER study development and implementation. 
• Improve the research infrastructure to enhance the validity 
and efficiency of CER studies.
• Develop a range of research methods applicable to CE. 
The ARRA authorized the creation of a Federal Coordinating 
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research. The health 
reform bills currently under consideration in Congress would 
create an entity, either within the government or operating 
independently, charged with ongoing coordination and 
prioritization of CER. 
Limited current use of CE in benefits decisions
Currently, health coverage programs and payers still define 
broad categories of covered benefits and cover services  
that are both “medically necessary” and “not experimental,” 
using CER to determine whether a particular service meets 
those thresholds.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is 
required by law to cover new medical goods and services 
that fall within the general categories of benefits and that 
are considered reasonable and necessary. The Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 restricted the use of comparative 
effectiveness information in Medicare decision-making and 
prohibited CMS from restricting coverage to new medicines 
on the basis of findings from CER. The agency typically does 
not reject coverage for a technology that is effective, even if it 
is less effective than an alternative.
How might CE affect health care?
In the best case, enhanced CE will lead to better quality  
of care and health outcomes by:
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• Improving clinical decision-making.
• Assisting patients to get the care they need. 
To accomplish this, CE will need to:
• Address topics with important health implications.
• Provide answers to practical questions about the 
effectiveness of alternative treatments.
• Support the translation of research findings into changes 
in practice. This will be especially important: in one study the 
lag between the discovery of more effective forms of treatment 
and their incorporation into routine patient care was 17 years. 
CE may yield cost savings by: 
• Demonstrating that some more expensive treatments 
are not necessarily superior to existing, less expensive 
treatments.
• Inducing changes in practice that favor cost-effective 
choices. 
Fears about CE relate primarily to the potential misuse 
of information developed on comparative effectiveness, 
including concerns that: 
• CE will result in rationing of expensive but effective 
treatment.  
• CE will promote government take-over of personal health 
care decisions. This is unlikely; the government has shown 
little appetite for intervening in health care decision-making 
in Medicare, for example. 
• CE could promote one-size-fits-all medicine that does not 
account for the clinical needs of individuals or sub-groups 
of patients with special needs. If CE is viewed as a tool for 
informed decision-making, however, individual clinical 
needs can be considered.
• CE could foster decisions that undervalue the patient’s 
perspective, values, and preferences. Studies can be 
designed, however, to be more sensitive to such concerns. 
• CE will impede the speed of technological development in 
health care, limiting the prospects for future improvements 
in treatment as expected profits from investment are 
curtailed. In fact, CE may lead to decision-making that 
rewards investment that increases value, and may help  
build the evidence for the comparative effectiveness of 
promising technologies. 
• CE will hold some drugs and devices to standards of relative 
effectiveness and cost- effectiveness that are not applied to 
all services and processes of care. Technologies which have 
been studied may be rewarded, to the detriment of low-
technology changes. These concerns can be addressed by 
broadly defining the scope of CE.  
How will CE be used?
The development of CE information is hardly sufficient to 
ensure its adoption. Difficulties in accessing and interpreting 
research findings and the limited incentives and support for 
incorporating research findings into practice limit the effect 
of these findings on clinical decision-making.
While the health reform bills under consideration in Congress 
would promote and coordinate investment in CER, they 
actually limit how the information generated can be used. 
Serious consideration should therefore be given to:
• Investigating why evidence so often has a limited and slow 
impact on practice.
• Evaluating policies and practices that improve acceptance 
of treatments with demonstrated effectiveness. 
• Disseminating effective implementation strategies.
• Implementing changes in incentives or other initiatives that 
prove effective. 
The role of costs
Possible options for taking costs into account in conducting 
and using CE include: 
• Using cost as a criterion in selecting topics for CE, and 
ensuring that CE focuses on areas with the greatest 
potential to increase the efficiency of health care delivery.
• Including empirical questions about relative cost–
effectiveness in research designs. 
• Incorporating cost considerations when using CE in medical 
decision-making. 
Neither of the health reform bills that emerged from the 
House and Senate combine support for CE with authorization 
of the consideration of costs. Policymakers have been 
reluctant to discuss what sort of intervention is appropriate, 
acceptable or desirable to influence a patient’s choice of 
health care treatment. This question much be tackled to 
define an appropriate role for costs in CE. 
Conclusions
There are significant challenges in undertaking a CE initiative, 
and understandable concerns about CE’s having unanticipated 
and undesirable impacts. Those seeking to further CE 
should be cognizant of these concerns and make sure that 
CE activities are transparent to the public. Efforts to distill 
lessons from extensive past experience in federal work on 
comparative effectiveness, now extending over at least three 
decades, should be a priority.
While investing in CE can be a path for improving the quality 
of health care and increasing the value of health expenditure, 
we cannot fall into the trap of thinking that just doing the 
research is enough to change practice, when all evidence 
suggests that this is far from true. Rather, CE should be 
considered a valuable part of a larger effort to foster evidence-
based medicine, along with changes in incentives and the 
organization of health-care delivery that are essential to 
promote and support high-quality health care. 
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Introduction 
Reflecting the view currently popular 
among analysts that the U.S. health 
system could benefit from the 
generation and use of more information 
on the comparative effectiveness (CE) of 
alternatives for treating and preventing 
health conditions, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) took steps towards creating a 
bigger role for research on CE in the 
U.S. health system. Congressional health 
reform proposals would go further 
to develop an infrastructure for the 
ongoing prioritization, generation, 
coordination and dissemination 
of information on comparative 
effectiveness. As to how the information 
is to be used and by whom, with what 
sorts of institutional supports, very little 
has been agreed upon, and many of the 
most promising options for influencing 
health care practice are subject to strong 
objections from stakeholders.
Debates about raising the profile of 
CE have generated a lot of controversy 
and left open a number of decisions 
that will determine its impact on 
health care delivery, quality of care and 
outcomes. The public debate on these 
unresolved issues continues, even as 
public- and private-sector actors move 
forward to implement those decisions 
that have been made. The effect gives 
the impression of a group of travelers 
starting off on a journey by making 
a big investment in travel gear, but 
with disagreement on the intended 
final destination and the intent to buy 
a map and to make hotel reservations 
and transport arrangements along the 
way. One hopes that it proves to be a 
rewarding trip, but fears that the failure 
to plan in advance is likely to result in 
worthless detours.
This issue brief aims to further the 
ongoing policy debate by investigating 
the implications for U.S. health care 
of an increased role for comparative 
effectiveness research and related 
activities. It considers the specific hopes 
and fears of experts and stakeholders 
with respect to the prospective impact 
of CE on quality and outcomes, and 
evaluates the basis for those beliefs. It 
looks at what policy options are on the 
table, and the implications of various 
alternatives for quality and outcomes 
of health care. In so doing, it draws 
on lessons from U.S. and international 
experience with CE.
The case for more and 
better information on what 
works in health care
The quality of health care depends 
on providers “doing the right thing, 
at the right time, for the right person, 
and having the best possible result.”1 
But research has demonstrated that 
patients receive only about one-half of 
the health care that is recommended 
by medical experts as appropriate for 
them,2 while as much as one-third of 
certain treatments are unnecessary, 
inappropriate or even contradicted 
for the patients who receive them.3 
Furthermore, variation in practice 
across the country is significant, and 
much larger than can be explained 
by differences in patient health status 
alone, indicating that certain procedures 
are subject to widespread underuse  
and/or overuse.4
Uncertainty as to what is best for 
patients under particular circumstances 
is one reason why health care often falls 
short in terms of quality. Specifically, 
uncertainty as to the effectiveness (i.e., 
benefits and risks) of treatments and 
the relative effectiveness of alternative 
treatments can and does result in 
suboptimal care (i.e., underuse, overuse 
and misuse of health services and 
medicines) and outcomes.
The persistence of uncertainty can 
be explained, in part, by important 
shortfalls in evidence. The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) estimates that only 
half of the treatments and services that 
comprise standard medical care have 
been proven to be effective.5 And even 
where a treatment has been proven 
effective, the degree to which it is more 
effective than alternative treatments, 
and the circumstances in which it 
constitutes a more effective treatment, 
is often unknown. The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, for example, 
requires evidence of the efficacy 
of new medicines, as compared to 
placebo, but generally does not demand 
evidence from head-to-head trials with 
the prevailing treatment.6 While some 
such research is done anyway, there 
is not enough of it. Furthermore, the 
information generated through the 
research is not always used in health-
care decisionmaking, both because the 
comparisons may not be particularly 
clinically relevant and because such 
information is not collected and 
disseminated systematically.7 Much 
of standard practice thus reflects 
tradition, expert opinion, training, 
marketing or some combination thereof, 
rather than application of evidence 
derived from research related to specific 
health care options.
In short, the goal of the recent surge of 
initiatives on comparative effectiveness 
is to produce more clinically relevant, 
timely information, relying on new 
research methods and databases. Such 
information is more likely to be useful 
and therefore used routinely by a variety 
of decisionmakers, including patients, 
clinicians, and payers. It is important 
to note that 62 physician organizations 
signed onto a letter endorsing “a robust, 
federally sponsored independent 
Comparative Effectiveness Research 
(CER) enterprise—one that emphasizes 
real-life study populations, head-to-head 
treatment comparisons, and identifying 
treatments most likely to benefit specific 
groups of patients—would enable 
physicians and patients together to make 
informed decisions.”8
What is comparative 
effectiveness?
Comparative effectiveness is a relatively 
new term used to designate a type of 
research and analysis that is not new. As 
with any new term, different definitions 
are in use, leading to some lack of clarity 
in the ongoing policy discussions. In 
this section we review the key points 
of similarity and differentiation in 
definitions, with particular attention to 
those aspects that have implications for 
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expectations about the impact of CE on 
health care delivery.
In 2007, the IOM defined comparative 
effectiveness as “the comparison of one 
diagnostic or treatment option to one 
or more others,”9 in this way identifying 
CE as a subset of a body of work known 
as outcomes research or effectiveness 
research, the study of how a health 
service or technology works in practice, 
in terms of its impact on patients and 
patient care. Other definitions put 
forward by various participants in the 
ongoing policy debate are similar in 
describing comparative effectiveness  
 as the study of risks and harms 
associated with two or more 
alternatives in health care. 
Definitions in current use differ 
primarily in terms of how broadly or 
narrowly they define the activities that 
are considered to be part of CE (e.g., 
observational and/or experimental 
research studies, literature review or 
synthesis), the specification (or not)  
that CE is confined to clinical 
considerations or expanded to 
encompass economic, ethical or other 
criteria for evaluation, and the possible 
subjects of CE (e.g., medical services, 
drugs, devices, therapies, procedures, 
and even delivery system and work 
process improvements).
Some definitions (e.g., that of the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
known as MedPAC) specify that CE is 
concerned with clinical effectiveness, 
while others (e.g., that of the American 
College of Physicians) refer to additional 
dimensions for comparison, such 
as safety and cost. Other definitions 
(e.g., that of the Congressional Budget 
Office) indicate that CE is intended to 
compare effectiveness or impact without 
specifying particular dimensions of study.
The IOM made a further distinction 
between primary comparative 
effectiveness research, which “involves 
the direct generation of clinical 
information on the relative merits 
or outcomes of one intervention in 
comparison to one or more others,” 
and secondary CER, which “involves 
the synthesis of primary studies to 
allow conclusions to be drawn.”10 
(As illustrated in figure 1, secondary 
comparative effectiveness research 
may be considered a type of health 
technology assessment, which 
examines the medical, economic, 
social and ethical implications of the 
incremental value, diffusion and use of 
an intervention used to promote health.) 
The distinction is noteworthy in that 
the term “comparative effectiveness 
research” is used by some experts and 
stakeholders to denote primary research 
exclusively, with synthetic work referred 
to as CE reviews, analyses or studies.
Figure 1.  How Research Affects Medical Practice
Source: Authors.
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In 2009, another IOM committee 
revisited the earlier IOM definition, 
broadening it to include the study of 
methods to “prevent, diagnose, treat, 
and monitor a clinical condition or 
to improve the delivery of care.”11 
Particularly notable is the extension 
of the definition to include alternative 
approaches to health care delivery, 
which goes beyond what had been 
encompassed in previous definitions. 
The 2009 IOM definition further 
describes the purpose of CER as “to 
assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, 
and policy makers to make informed 
decisions that will improve health 
care at both the individual and the 
population levels.” 
Background and recent 
history of CE in the  
United States
As discussed above, comparative 
effectiveness comprises a well-
established body of work that predates 
the current policy interest.12 Rather 
than kick-start a new research direction, 
recent legislative initiatives and current 
proposals instead address one or more 
of several objectives: to generate more 
comparative effectiveness research, 
to see that it is better prioritized and 
coordinated to meet information needs 
without duplication, to apply new 
research methods taking advantage of 
administrative and clinical databases to 
complement traditional clinical trials to 
better support clinical decisionmaking, 
and to improve dissemination of 
research findings to providers and 
patients with the aim of influencing 
medical practice. Notably, few legislative 
initiatives address the intended use of 
information derived from CER, except to 
specify ways in which the information 
is not to be used. A review of the history 
of U.S. initiatives in this area provides 
context that helps in understanding the 
current situation.
Who is conducting CER?
In the United States, CER is funded by 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and its agencies. The 
Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) largely funds secondary 
CER, and the National Institutes for 
Health (NIH) serves as the dominant 
funder of primary CER, although 
this type of research has not been a 
significant contender in terms of NIH 
priorities. Total funding for health 
services research in all HHS agencies 
totaled just $1.5 billion in 2008, of 
which a very small share ($30 million 
at AHRQ, plus a small share of funding 
in other agencies) was devoted to CER. 
By contrast, the bulk of the NIH annual 
research budget of $28 billion is devoted 
to basic research intended to provide 
scientific inroads in the prevention 
and treatment of disease. And in the 
broadest context, less than 0.1 percent 
of the more than $2 trillion in annual 
U.S. health expenditure was allocated to 
work on comparative effectiveness.13
Complementing the government role in 
financing research for use by all who can 
benefit from the information generated, 
some CER is privately financed, 
including proprietary, primary research 
funded by those with a financial stake 
in a new health technology14, as well as 
secondary research funded by private 
insurers seeking to inform their benefits 
management programs. Nonprofit 
organizations and private foundations 
add to the store of knowledge, as well.
AHRQ’s work in CER dates to the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003, which authorized the agency 
to undertake research to evaluate 
the clinical effectiveness and 
appropriateness of health services, so 
as to improve the quality, effectiveness 
and efficiency of health care delivered 
through Medicare, Medicaid and the 
Historical controversy associated with government CER initiatives
The controversy associated with development of CER is evident from its longer-term history. For example, AHRQ is the 
reincarnation of an older agency, known from 1989 to 1999 as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), 
which also had a history of work relating to CE, including the development of clinical practice guidelines that drew 
conclusions based upon synthesis of available evidence on effectiveness and comparative effectiveness. In fact, AHCPR 
lost its authorization to produce clinical practice guidelines and was very nearly eliminated due to controversy over the 
legitimacy and value of its clinical practice guidelines.1 The agency drew fire from back surgeons for its recommendations 
for treatment of lower-back pain, which were based on findings that the outcomes from surgery were no better than those 
obtained from medical management of the condition. Another charge leveled by critics, which included public advisory 
bodies such as the Physician Payment Review Commission and the General Accounting Office, was a lack of evidence that 
the guidelines had succeeded in influencing medical practice.
AHCPR was not even the first federal government agency to come under fire for controversial work assessing the 
effectiveness of health care. At least two agencies, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the National 
Center for Health Care Technology, both succumbed to pressure by opponents of their work. OTA, created in 1972, was 
dismantled in 1995 after the Republican takeover of the House in the 1994 elections. The National Center was established in 
1978 to review evidence on effectiveness and cost of health technologies and to advise on Medicare coverage, as well as to 
prioritize research, and was dissolved three years later. 
1 Bradford H. Gray, Michael K. Gusmano, and Sara R. Collins, “AHCPR And The Changing Politics of Health Services Research,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive, 
June 25, 2003.
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State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program. By 2008, the annual budget 
had doubled to $30 million.
The provision in ARRA that allocated an 
additional $1.1 billion in new CER to be 
financed by the Department of Health 
and Human Services ($400 million) and 
its agencies, the NIH ($400 million) and 
the AHRQ ($300 million), reflects  
a consideration that the United States 
had underinvested in the development 
of CER.
Not just more research, but better 
research
Irrespective of whether the volume of 
CER is socially optimal, another issue is 
whether CER could be more effective 
if there were a concerted effort to 
establish cross-cutting priorities for 
research, to take stock of and coordinate 
research efforts, and to highlight 
the need for research in areas with 
important information gaps. A recent 
study by AcademyHealth researchers 
found that there is a “significant volume” 
of comparative effectiveness research 
being undertaken in the United States, 
but that there is a lack of coordination 
across and within funding agencies, 
impeding an assessment of the 
sufficiency and qualities of the research 
pool as a whole.15
Some analysts emphasize the need 
to fundamentally alter the nature of 
current comparative effectiveness 
research to better achieve new 
expectations by:
• meaningfully involving patients, 
clinicians, payers and other 
decisionmakers in key phases 
of CER study development and 
implementation; 
• improving the research infrastructure 
to enhance the validity and efficiency 
of CER studies; and
• developing a range of research 
methods, grounded in use of empirical 
data, to replace the traditional 
“hierarchies of evidence,” and its 
reliance on experimental methods to 
produce comparative effectiveness 
evidence.16
It should be noted that the debate 
about whether and how to move away 
from traditional research approaches 
is not yet resolved, with some parties 
expressing concern about the limitations 
of new research approaches, even  
when acknowledging the problems 
with the methods generally used, as 
discussed below.
In ARRA, the Congress created the 
Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research to 
coordinate comparative effectiveness 
research and related health services 
research across the federal government. 
The council was also charged with 
advising the President and the 
Congress on strategies to address the 
infrastructure needs for CER within the 
federal government, and organizational 
expenditures for CER by relevant federal 
departments and agencies. Furthermore, 
the legislation directed the council to 
submit to the President and the Congress 
a report describing federal activities 
on CER and recommendations for such 
research conducted or supported from 
ARRA funds by June 30, 2009. 
Following on this initiative, the health 
reform bills passed by the House and 
the Senate would create an entity, 
charged with ongoing coordination 
and prioritization of CER.17 The Senate 
bill calls for establishment of a semi-
independent commission to sponsor 
CER, whereas the House bill would 
place CER in AHRQ. Concern has been 
raised about whether the commissions 
approach would provide affected 
industry—device manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical companies—too great 
a role in controlling the allocation 
of funds, the design of studies, and 
decisions about which results can be 
published.18
Is there demand for CE for use in 
decision-making?
One reason why the coordination role 
has been unfilled until recently is that, 
unlike Canada and European countries 
that have a larger government role 
in financing and delivery of health 
services, the United States lacks a 
formal infrastructure for making use of 
CE information to promote evidence-
based care. Canada, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and other countries with 
publicly regulated or administered 
systems of health coverage have 
established institutions charged with 
undertaking secondary CER to inform 
decisions about coverage of services, 
including appropriate indications and 
reimbursement levels for medicines 
or other services that may be subject 
to varying co-payment rates, and/
or guidelines for prevention and 
treatment. Although the institutions 
vary in the scope of responsibilities 
and in the details of how CE studies 
are undertaken, such institutions 
typically identify areas where basic 
evidence on comparative effectiveness 
is missing. In some jurisdictions (e.g., 
Belgium, Ontario, the United Kingdom), 
such information is used to feed into 
academic, government and private CE 
research agendas.19, 20
In the multi-payer environment of the 
United States, individual programs and 
payers undertake or commission their 
own work to synthesize research on 
effectiveness, comparative effectiveness 
and costs, to differing degrees. But to a 
greater extent than exists in many other 
countries, the ability of both public and 
private to restrict coverage for a service 
on the basis of evidence that it is less 
effective than others, less cost-effective 
than others, or even ineffective, is 
relatively limited. Most payers still 
define broad categories of covered 
benefits and specify that those services 
that are both “medically necessary” 
and “not experimental” are covered.21 
Primary and secondary CER is used by 
private payers primarily in determining 
whether a particular service meets those 
thresholds, how it should be reimbursed 
(i.e. awarded a higher reimbursement 
rate), and whether it can be considered 
medically necessary in a particular 
patient’s case.22, 23
The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) is required 
by law to cover new medical goods 
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and services that fall within the 55 
general categories of benefits and 
that are considered “reasonable and 
necessary” for diagnosis or treatment 
of an illness or injury. Republican 
and Democratic Administrations 
have tried unsuccessfully, because of 
political opposition, to promulgate a 
Medicare rule to implement this broad 
congressional directive by specifying 
specific implementation criteria 
that could include considerations of 
comparative effectiveness and even 
cost-effectiveness for new technology 
or additional uses for already approved 
technology.24 Accordingly, at present 
there are no formal criteria for national 
coverage decisionmaking in Medicare25 
and the agency typically does not 
reject coverage for a technology that is 
effective, even if it is less effective than 
an alternative. 
CMS attempts to base coverage 
decisions of new technologies partly 
on commissioned health technology 
assessments to aid in making national 
coverage decisions. Indeed, a central 
purpose of the Medicare Evidence 
Development Coverage Advisory 
Committee, which advises CMS on 
coverage decisions, is to define how 
new technologies proposed for coverage 
compare to existing ones.26 Despite 
these intentions, however, a recent 
analysis of 100 consecutive national 
coverage decisions found that, in 
the majority of cases, coverage was 
approved even though the evidence 
of effectiveness was considered by 
reviewers to be only fair or poor. 
Moreover, the Medicare Modernization 
Act of 2003 restricted the use of 
comparative effectiveness information 
in Medicare decisionmaking by, for 
example, prohibiting the agency from 
setting payment rates with respect to 
relative effectiveness in comparison 
with existing treatments and prohibited 
CMS from restricting coverage to new 
medicines on the basis of findings  
from CER.27
How might CE affect  
health care?
An informal survey of writings by 
experts and stakeholders on their 
aspirations, concerns and expectations 
with respect to the prospect of an 
enhanced role for CE in U.S. health 
care revealed some common threads. 
Below we summarize and comment on 
the hopes and fears associated with CE 
development. 
The hopes…
The most frequently articulated hope 
or aspiration for enhanced CE is that it 
will lead to better quality of care and 
health outcomes by improving clinical 
decisionmaking , achieving more 
congruence between the care patients 
need and the care they get. For example, 
some have argued that CER offers a 
way to promote identification of the 
best approaches to medicine that can 
be adapted to the needs of individual 
patients (so-called “personalized 
medicine”) by analyzing the impact 
of different treatments in subgroups 
within broader populations.28 To the 
extent health care can be better targeted 
to patients’ particular circumstances, 
it should be possible to obtain better 
treatment outcomes.
Meeting this expectation for better 
quality and more personalized 
medical care requires, first, that CER 
address topics with important health 
implications, second, that studies 
answer practical questions that 
patients, practitioners, and payers 
have regarding the effectiveness of 
alternatives, and third, that research 
findings are employed in ways leading 
to changes in practice. While the 
first two prerequisites seem fully 
achievable29, based on past experience, 
the track record with respect to the 
latter point leaves the prospects for 
quality improvement uncertain. In 
fact, medical practice is notoriously 
slow to change in response to new 
research findings: one analysis found 
the lag between the discovery of more 
effective forms of treatment and their 
incorporation into routine patient care 
averages 17 years.30 Contributing to this 
lag is the relative lack of effectiveness 
research under average conditions in 
diverse populations and clinical practice 
settings, in contrast to the traditional 
clinical trials, which typically investigate 
intervention efficacy under conditions 
established by research protocols 
that are not necessarily replicated in 
practice.31
Two examples demonstrate how 
difficult and slow is change in medical 
practice in the face of evidence 
that change can result in dramatic 
improvements in quality. A fairly recent 
example is the experience with carotid 
endarterectomy. Research in the late 
1980s found that as many as one-third 
of patients undergoing this treatment 
were poor candidates, in that the risks 
of the surgery exceeded the potential 
benefits.32 A follow-up study more 
than a decade later found significant 
improvement, yet still more than 10 
percent of those who underwent 
the treatment were inappropriate 
candidates.33, 34 Another example relates 
to the importance of caregivers’ washing 
their hands prior to patient contact, 
which was found to reduce infection 
and deaths as early as the 1840s. Despite 
prominent research and broad media 
coverage citing tens of thousands of 
deaths annually attributed to hospital-
acquired infections, compliance with 
hand washing standards in hospitals 
ranges from 30 to 50 percent.35
This is not to say that it is impossible to 
use evidence to change medical care. 
When research on the use of hormone 
replacement therapy was interrupted 
in progress because of findings of 
increased cardiovascular and cancer 
risks associated with the treatment, 
physicians reduced their prescriptions 
of hormone replacement therapy by 
40 percent over a two-year period, 
for example.36 But in the absence of 
dramatic and widely reported findings—
in this case, easily understandable by 
the affected patient population—it 
takes more than mere dissemination 
of evidence to achieve rapid change. 
Development of focused interventions 
geared towards changing practice, 
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relying on support and incentives,  
have shown promise, although they  
are still atypical.37
The second most frequently articulated 
hope is that CE will yield cost savings 
by demonstrating that certain more 
expensive treatments (often new 
versions of available treatments) are not 
necessarily superior to available, less 
expensive treatments, and by inducing 
changes in practice that favor cost-
effective choices. Indeed, there is every 
reason to think that CER will continue 
to reveal instances in which newer or 
more invasive treatments—nearly always 
more expensive—are no more effective 
than available, less invasive ones, as it 
has in the past. For example, a 2002 
study found that newer drugs known 
as ACE inhibitors and calcium channel 
blockers were no more effective than 
older diuretic medicines in controlling 
hypertension, despite costing thirty 
times as much.38 Similarly, a 2006 
study found that second-generation 
anti-psychotic medications, priced at 
ten times the cost of older products, 
were no more effective than their 
predecessors.39
But cost savings will depend on the 
extent to which not only research 
findings but also treatment choices 
favor less expensive alternatives. And 
here there is reason to question the 
potential for CE findings, in and of 
themselves, to result in changes in 
practice. Indeed, practice is very slow 
to adapt to new research findings, 
even in cases where significant cost 
savings are possible. For instance, 
the 2002 study of hypertensives has 
had little impact on practice patterns, 
reflecting a combination of factors 
including successful marketing by 
the manufacturers of their on-patent 
medicines.40 An information campaign 
sponsored by the National Institutes 
of Health was largely unsuccessful. 
Even the cost-conscious Veterans 
Administration did not require doctors 
to prescribe diuretics as a first-line 
treatment because administrators 
expected too many physicians would 
request exceptions.41 While some 
speculate that increasing pressure to 
control costs in the health sector will 
spur greater use of CER, such pressure 
has so far failed to produce incentives 
for patients and physicians to take 
account of the relative cost of treatment 
options in clinical decisionmaking .
… and the fears
The list of fears associated with CE 
activities is a longer one. Many of 
the fears stem from the concern that 
increased information about what 
works will lead to reduced choice at 
the level of individual patient or doctor, 
particularly if information about relative 
cost is used in policy or administrative 
decisions. Other fears relate to the 
expectations regarding the conduct and 
outcomes of CER itself.
A common concern is that CE will result 
in rationing of expensive but effective 
treatment (either for the population as 
a whole or for particular populations, 
such as elderly and disabled Medicare 
beneficiaries). At present, rationing 
in the U.S. health system is implicit—
individuals with different insurance 
benefits or with no health insurance 
face very different costs associated 
with choice of different options, and 
some options are unaffordable for some 
individuals. With few exceptions, the 
cost of a treatment is not considered 
legitimate grounds for noncoverage 
of an effective treatment, although 
cost-sharing differentiation is used for 
covered benefits with readily observable 
differences in cost-effectiveness (e.g., 
generic versus on-patent medicines). 
Thus rationing occurs on the basis of 
willingness and ability to pay. This 
form of rationing is common to the 
less-developed countries of the world, 
where coverage is not universal. But in 
many developed countries, rationing is 
more explicit: formal decisionmaking 
processes are used to define what 
services and medicines are covered 
and under what circumstances. In 
these countries, receipt of market 
authorization is not sufficient to 
penetrate the pharmaceutical market, for 
example; a separate process, which may 
take into account relative effectiveness 
and, less commonly, cost-effectiveness, 
determines whether the new product or 
service should be included as a covered 
benefit and the share of the cost to be 
paid by the user, if any.
An important difference between the 
U.S. health system and those of other 
developed countries lies in the notion 
of solidarity, however, making it very 
unlikely that the United States would 
adopt a system of explicit rationing, 
irrespective of investment in CE. In 
tax-financed systems like that used 
in England’s National Health Service, 
which allocate a fixed budget for 
services, the population generally 
accepts42 that choices must be made; 
financing a costly treatment that extends 
the life of a terminally ill patient for 
weeks or months must be weighed 
against the value of financing more 
hip replacements that improve the 
quality of life for recipients. In a largely 
privately financed system like that of 
the United States, by contrast, coverage 
expansion results in cost and premium 
increases that increasingly render 
insurance unaffordable for some, but 
there is relatively little social pressure 
to make decisions that increase the 
value or efficiency of collective health 
expenditures. 
In this respect, the United States is not 
dissimilar from those health systems 
of western Europe that are financed by 
social insurance, which tend to have 
comprehensive coverage schemes and 
tend to squeeze prices and fees, rather 
than limit access to services. When 
using CER in coverage, pricing or 
reimbursement decisions, questions of 
cost impact and cost-effectiveness are 
not always subject to explicit, formal 
consideration. In some countries, 
including France and, up until recently, 
Germany, decisionmakers are not 
authorized to consider cost-effectiveness 
in coverage decisions (and in the 
technology assessments prepared to 
support the decisions).43
If explicit rationing in the U.S. health 
system is unlikely, the threat of a closely 
related concern is that CE will promote 
government take-over of personal 
health care decisions is also minimal. 
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In administering the publicly financed 
Medicare program, the government has 
shown little appetite for intervening 
in health-care decisionmaking and 
hesitates to use information on relative 
effectiveness to restrict coverage. 
Absent the Congress providing 
explicit authority to do so, there is 
no basis for thinking that investing 
in more information will change that 
position, although pressure for more 
intervention in Medicare could increase 
as cost growth threatens program 
sustainability. In terms of influence on 
private coverage, the government has 
neither the incentive nor the means 
to interfere in health-care decisions. 
Even in countries, like the United 
Kingdom, which make formal use of CE 
in determining whether a product or 
service constitutes a covered benefit that 
is financed collectively, there tends to be 
no interference with clinical autonomy 
in determining what care is appropriate 
for a patient in a given case.44 This 
stands in contrast to the practice of 
insurers in the United States, many of 
whom employ management practices 
such as prior authorization and post-
utilization review, which challenge the 
judgment of health care practitioners, 
for better or worse, and sometimes 
result in denial of payment. 
Another concern is that CE could 
promote one-size-fits-all medicine 
that does not account for the clinical 
needs of individuals and/or sub-
groups of patients with special needs, 
i.e., personalized medicine. Here the 
concern is that CER studies themselves 
cannot readily include patients with 
complex cases and multiple conditions, 
some of whom might have different 
experience with particular treatments. 
The validity of this concern depends on 
the extent to which CE is used to limit 
treatment options, as opposed to helping 
to promote informed decisionmaking 
under particular circumstances.
Additional concerns relate to the 
potential for CE to foster decisions that 
undervalue the patient perspective, 
values, and preferences. Here, much 
depends on the way in which CE 
studies are designed. Some focus 
primarily on clinical outcomes such as 
reductions in mortality and morbidity. 
They may not be designed to take into 
account aspects of a treatment that 
patients value, regardless of whether 
they have an apparent and significant 
health impact. Examples include 
preferences for oral administration of 
a medicine or reduced frequency of 
administration, which might influence 
patient compliance and, thus, outcomes. 
But studies can be designed to be more 
sensitive to such concerns; inclusion of 
patient representation in establishing 
frameworks for study design may help.
Another argument against CE is that it 
will impede the speed of technological 
development in health care, limiting 
the prospects for future improvements 
in treatment, to the extent that 
expected profits from investment 
are curtailed. However, even with 
the massive increase in CE spending 
under ARRA, total expenditures on 
CER account for just 1.5 percent of 
the $100 billion invested annually 
in R&D and regulatory approval for 
new technologies.45 While it is true 
that reduced expectations for returns 
on investment would be expected to 
reduce the overall level of investment, 
it is also true that decisionmaking that 
better rewards valued investment (e.g., 
those innovations that offer important 
benefits) would provide investors 
with incentives to focus R&D on areas 
where there is the most potential to 
develop innovation that is most wanted 
and needed.46 And coverage decisions 
can provide support for emerging 
technologies by financing treatment 
in head-to-head trials for promising 
technologies where evidence on 
comparative effectiveness is lacking  
and needed.
A final concern is that CE will contribute 
to allocative inefficiency in health 
expenditure by holding specific 
technologies (drugs and devices) to 
standards of relative effectiveness and 
possibly cost effectiveness that are not 
applied to all services and processes 
of care. On the other hand, some have 
argued that a strict regime of evidence-
based coverage would tend to reward 
technologies which have been studied—
primarily drugs, devices or other 
technologies where there is a potential 
for the study’s funder to reap monopoly 
profits from adoption and diffusion—
and create a bias against low-technology 
changes, such as new uses for a generic 
drug, a better diagnostic strategy, or 
improvements in delivering care.47 These 
concerns provide a good argument to 
define the scope of CE broadly, using 
agreed criteria for prioritizing among 
the plethora of possible topics. Of the 
100 priorities recommended for study 
by the IOM Committee responding to 
the ARRA mandate to develop initial 
national priorities for CER, almost half 
were topics involving delivery of care  
or work process alternatives.
In sum, the fears associated with CE 
are very much related to the potential 
misuse of information developed on 
comparative effectiveness. They can be 
averted by recognizing that CE provides 
useful information and valuable input for 
making decisions that would otherwise 
be made in the absence of information, 
but that good decisions depend on 
sound decisionmaking as well as on 
good input.
Determinants of the  
impact of CE: Policy  
issues and options
The extent to which CE meets the hopes 
and avoids the risks discussed above 
depends largely on decisions made 
in several key areas. We review these 
policy issues and options below.
How will CE be used?
Some discussions of CER seem to take 
for granted the assumption that well-
designed research with important 
findings will be sure to influence health 
care. But the fact is that development 
of CER information is hardly sufficient 
to ensure its uptake. Difficulties in 
accessing and interpreting research 
findings and the limited incentives 
and support for incorporating findings 
into practice contribute to the slow 
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rate at which research findings are 
incorporated in medical practice. It 
is presumably for this reason that the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) did 
not assume major savings from a major 
investment in CER on health care costs.48 
CBO speculated that the impact of CER 
might be larger if there were incentives 
and processes for more rapid and 
effective transfer of CER findings into 
the practice of medicine.49
Current research is often not designed 
or presented in ways intended to 
address the practical questions of 
relative benefits and risks that most 
concern patients, physicians and other 
decisionmakers. Furthermore, practicing 
physicians and others whose decisions 
or behavior could be influenced by 
information on CE do not always have 
time to keep current with the plethora 
of studies published in the peer-
reviewed journals and other outlets, 
even within a particular specialty.
CE research has increased impact when 
it has been synthesized and interpreted 
for intended users of the information, 
including health care professionals, 
patients, and administrators.50 Many 
authorities and interested parties 
do work to bring information from 
comparative effectiveness research 
to intended audiences by producing 
clinical practice guidelines, patient 
information tools and health technology 
assessment reports for use by hospital 
administrators, insurers and others 
responsible for purchasing or benefits 
decisions. Still, the incentives to use 
information on CE in decisionmaking 
are weaker than they might be. For the 
most part, coverage, reimbursement 
and provider payment schemes have not 
been designed to promote and ensure 
high-quality care, but to meet other 
objectives (e.g., cost control, profit 
maximization).
In her influential Health Affairs 
article of 2006, health economist Gail 
Wilensky made an argument on the 
need for creating a new comparative 
effectiveness center charged with 
producing primary CER, but noted 
that “better information about the 
comparative effectiveness of various 
medical strategies and procedures 
might not, in itself, lead to better 
decision making in health care unless 
there is also a major change in financial 
incentives.”
Indeed, at present, few actors in 
the health care system face strong 
incentives to seek out and use evidence 
from CER. Private health insurers, for 
example, can pass on the costs of new 
technologies in premium increases 
and face little competitive pressure to 
limit the package of covered benefits. 
Practitioners are largely remunerated 
on a fee-for-service basis and are not 
held accountable for health outcomes 
or even adherence to up-to-date 
standards of care. In fact, research on 
the impact of eight of Medicare’s local 
coverage decisions found no statistically 
significant changes in practice relating 
to seven of the decisions following 
the implementation of a new coverage 
policy.51, 52 Patients have perhaps the 
greatest incentives, but relatively few 
are equipped to make use of the highly 
technical scientific evidence generated 
through CER and to understand how it 
applies to their particular situation. 
The specific channels through which 
the enhanced investment in CE that has 
been made through ARRA are expected 
to effect changes in medical practice are 
undefined and unclear at present. While 
many of the health reform bills under 
consideration in the House and Senate  
would take further steps to promote 
and coordinate investment in CER, 
the bills would actually limit how the 
information generated can be used. 
So far there have been more indications 
about how CE is not to be used than the 
contrary. For example, the conference 
report from ARRA notes that the 
“conferees do not intend for the CER 
finding to be used to mandate coverage, 
reimbursement, or other policies for  
any public or private payer.”53 Similarly, 
both the House and Senate health 
reform bills contain language that would 
prohibit the use of CER findings to deny 
or ration care, or to make coverage 
decisions in Medicare.
Some stakeholders do see a role for CER 
information in policy decisionmaking, 
however. As part of its recommendations 
calling for the creation of a new entity 
to manage CER, MedPAC stated that 
the new entity would have “no role” in 
“making or recommending coverage 
decisions for payers”54 but does point 
to ways in which CMS might use the 
information generated through CER in 
both coverage decisions and payment 
design (e.g., through development of a 
tiered cost-sharing structure).
A strong argument could be made 
that, however great the potential 
importance of new research findings to 
be generated through new CER, there 
is greater marginal value to be gained 
from devoting additional resources to 
investigating why evidence so often has 
a limited and slow impact on practice, 
evaluating policies and practices 
that improve uptake of treatments 
with demonstrated effectiveness, 
disseminating effective implementation 
strategies, and implementing changes 
in incentives or other initiatives that 
prove effective. An illustration of this 
potential relates to the prescription of 
anticoagulant therapy for patients with 
atrial fibrillation. Despite publication 
of several research studies since 1989 
indicating that this therapy reduces 
risk of ischemic stroke by 68 percent 
or more, anticoagulants are still not 
prescribed for most patients in whom 
such treatment is indicated.55 Very 
recently, a new study has been published 
showing that a new, on-patent anti-
coagulant offers modest but statistically 
significant improvement in effectiveness 
over a medication for which the patent 
has expired. While some patients should 
benefit from the new research findings, 
to the extent that physicians prescribe 
the new treatment in place of the old, 
many more could benefit if either 
therapy was prescribed to a higher share 
of suitable candidates.
How and when, if at all, should cost 
considerations come into play?
One of the most contentious questions 
that arises in discussion of comparative 
effectiveness policy issues is that 
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of when, how, and even whether 
costs should be taken into account 
in undertaking CE and in using it in 
decisionmaking. There are a number 
of options, not mutually exclusive, 
for introducing cost considerations, 
ranging from using cost as a criterion 
in selecting topics for CE, to early 
inclusion of empirical questions about 
relative cost–effectiveness in research to 
incorporating cost considerations when 
using CE in decisionmaking. On the 
other hand, it is also entirely possible to 
proceed with a CE program that features 
no formal or even informal role for cost 
considerations. 
Including cost as a criterion for 
the selection of topics on which to 
undertake CER offers potential for 
helping to focus on areas with great 
potential to increase the efficiency 
of health-care delivery, although that 
does not, in and of itself, serve to aid 
in identifying cost-effective treatment 
options. There is precedent for 
including cost impact as a criterion 
for selecting topics for investment in 
CER. The IOM committee responsible 
for developing a list of priority projects 
for research included the cost of a 
particular condition as a criterion 
for the committee’s consideration in 
selecting the most meritorious topics 
for research.56 Similarly, in its June 2009 
report, the Federal Coordinating Council 
on CER recommended that prospective 
CER studies be prioritized in terms of 
their potential impact in a number of 
areas, including cost. 
Going beyond topic selection, there is an 
argument for including cost studies as 
part of original research on effectiveness 
and comparative effectiveness, and an 
even stronger argument for including 
it in synthetic studies, using formal 
cost-effectiveness analysis or merely 
collecting and reporting data on the 
costs associated with alternatives. 
Absent such efforts, there are increased 
odds of not having the information for 
decisionmaking when needed. Further, 
information on a new product’s relative 
cost-effectiveness has potential to 
promote value even without the extreme 
option of restricting coverage in cases 
where there is no evidence of enhanced 
benefit or advantage to patients from 
a higher-cost alternative. It could be 
used to steer service choices to higher 
value by designating lower-cost, first-line 
treatments, for example. 
That said, the policy debate has veered 
in the direction of noninclusion. For 
example, the legislation that authorizes 
the AHRQ to conduct CER does not 
provide the agency with the authority  
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness  
of treatments. Of the health reform  
bills considered in the Congress, 
none that call for development of a 
new center for promulgating CER 
also authorizes consideration of costs, 
although such consideration was 
envisaged in a legislative proposal 
created by former Majority Leaders 
Baker, Daschle and Dole.57
Information on a new product’s relative 
cost-effectiveness has potential to 
promote value even without the extreme 
option of restricting coverage in cases 
where there is no evidence of enhanced 
benefit or advantage to patients from 
a higher-cost alternative. It could be 
used to steer service choices to higher 
value by designating lower-cost first-
line treatments, for example. The U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office concluded 
that CMS would need new authority to 
explicitly consider relative benefits and 
costs if CER is to have a sizeable impact 
on Medicare spending, however.58 Such 
authority could have advantages beyond 
the direct impact on Medicare spending, 
in that Medicare’s initiative could drive 
other payers to take further steps along 
this road, following a perception that 
government actions have increased 
the legitimacy of cost considerations 
in coverage. However, judging from 
the recent trend, as discussed above, it 
seems that the Congress is more inclined 
to forbid that Medicare consider costs in 
coverage decision making. 
The question of costs and whether 
something is worth the cost also arise, 
obviously, in other areas of policy-
making in the United States. In the 
environmental area, for example, formal 
cost-benefit analyses are sometimes used 
to evaluate prospective regulations prior 
to their promulgation. But these rules 
apply generally to the whole population, 
not to specific patients, who would 
have to bear the cost of decisions not 
to cover treatments that are marginally 
effective, if not cost-effective; explicit 
consideration of costs relative to benefits 
seems particularly controversial in the 
health area.59
Part of the problem may be a failure to 
engage sufficiently in debate over the 
question of what sort of intervention 
is appropriate, acceptable or desirable 
to influence a patient’s choice of 
health care treatment in the case of 
alternatives that differ in terms of 
prospective impact on both health 
and cost. The default position is that a 
patient should have whatever his health 
care practitioner considers clinically 
appropriate and that he can afford to 
pay for. In the face of widespread health 
insurance that pools resources to meet 
the costs of care for insured individuals, 
the question arises as to whether 
added costs for treatments that are not 
proven more effective than alternatives 
should be borne collectively, or by the 
individual who chooses the alternative. 
And in the face of publicly financed 
coverage for which the government 
is accountable to the taxpayer for 
efficient allocation of finite resources, 
the question arises as to whether the 
government has a responsibility to 
direct the use of public funds to care 
that provides greatest benefit, relative to 
its cost. Without such a dialogue, it may 
prove impossible to establish explicit 
cost considerations within the context 
of the current U.S. health system.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from 
the review undertaken in this brief.
U.S. history and international experience 
show that there will be significant 
challenges that must be carefully 
addressed if the latest CE initiative is 
to succeed. There are understandable 
fears and concerns about CER having 
unanticipated and undesirable impacts. 
The evolution of activities to further  
CER should be cognizant of these 
concerns and remain transparent to  
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the public. Efforts to distill lessons from 
extensive past experience in federal 
work on comparative effectiveness,  
now extending over at least three 
decades, should be a priority to avoid 
knowable pitfalls.
There is a need to proceed with clear 
objectives and a plan for accomplishing 
them. Unless we develop a plan for using 
CE that goes beyond mere dissemination 
to ensure practical implementation of 
findings, there is a risk that resources 
that have been invested will not have 
the impact on medical practice that 
they could and should have. While 
elaborating such a plan is beyond the 
scope of the present brief, there is much 
to draw upon from successful quality 
improvement experience, including 
experience showing that changed 
incentives, together with organizational 
support for practicing evidence-based 
medicine, can yield impressive results in 
institutions (hospitals, group practices) 
that have launched successful initiatives. 
It behooves policy makers to ensure that 
the health care financing and delivery 
environment is generally conducive to 
such initiatives. 
While investing in CE can be a path 
for improving the quality of health 
care and increasing the value of health 
expenditure, we cannot fall into the trap 
of thinking that just doing the research 
is enough to change practice, when all 
evidence suggests that this is far from 
true. Rather, CE should be considered 
a potentially important part of a bigger 
effort to foster evidence-based medicine, 
along with changes in incentives and 
the organization of health-care delivery 
that are needed to promote and support 
high-quality health care. 
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